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Abstract
This paper analyses the impact of the monetary regime on labour markets in a small open
economy, by considering the game between large wage setters and an independent central bank
in a two-sector model with potential labour mobility between sectors. Two monetary regimes are
considered: membership in a monetary union and an in￿ ation target combined with a ￿ exible
exchange rate. A key result is that when there is perfect labour mobility between sectors, the
monetary regime does not matter for real wages, employment or pro￿ts. Moreover, introducing
labour mobility substantially reduces wages and increases employment. Other ￿ndings are that
when labour is immobile between sectors: (i) the real wage in the tradables sector is higher under
in￿ ation targeting than in a monetary union, while the reverse applies to the non-tradables
sector; (ii) in￿ ation targeting generates higher employment and pro￿ts than membership in a
monetary union; and (iii) both workers and ￿rms in the two sectors in general prefer in￿ ation
targeting to membership in a monetary union.
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11 Introduction
Over the last decade, interest in the macroeconomic consequences of di⁄erent monetary regimes has
been unprecedented. In addition to the debate on optimal currency areas, spurred by the launch
of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), advocates of price stability have suggested that
in￿ ation or price level targeting may have desirable long-run e⁄ects on the economy by promoting
sustainable growth and higher employment.
In light of this debate, several studies have considered the interaction between monetary au-
thorities and labour markets. It has been shown that when wage setting is non-atomistic, a game
between large wage setters and the central bank emerges. The monetary regime then indeed mat-
ters for labour market outcomes; see for instance Cukierman and Lippi (1999), Soskice and Iversen
(2000), Coricelli et al (2000) and Calmfors (2001). A simple mechanism modelled in the previous
literature is that in the presence of a liberal central bank, in￿ ation-averse trade unions may have
an incentive to set wages at a low level in order to avoid in￿ ation (Cukierman and Lippi 1999). An-
other, perhaps more plausible, mechanism suggested in the literature is that a conservative central
bank may act as a deterrent to wage increases: by threatening to pursue contractionary monetary
policy in response to high wage claims, the central bank creates an incentive for wage restraint
because large unions will then face higher cost of increasing wages in terms of lower employment
(Soskice and Iversen 2000, Corricelli et al. 2000 and Lippi 2003). Although the majority of previ-
ous studies model closed economies, exceptions include Vartiainen (2002) and Holden (2003), who
model the game between large wage setters and an independent central bank in two-sector models
of a small open economy where labour is sector-speci￿c. These studies show that in￿ ation targeting
is likely to generate higher employment and welfare than credible exchange rate targeting.
In this paper, I argue that it is impossible to establish whether there are sustainable e⁄ects of the
monetary regime on labour markets in a framework with sector-speci￿c labour. In order to ensure
that what has been observed in the theoretical literature are permanent e⁄ects rather than short-
run deviations from long-run equilibrium, one needs to allow for worker migration across sectors
of the economy. If wages di⁄er across sectors, rational workers should move to sectors where their
expected income is higher, given the opportunity. Therefore, the impact of the monetary regime
on labour markets may be exaggerated in models where labour is immobile across sectors of the
2economy.
This paper extends the previous theoretical literature on the interaction between large wage
setters and the central bank in small open economies by considering a labour market set-up featuring
the realistic assumption of labour mobility between the tradables and non-tradables sectors. I
distinguish between the regimes of in￿ ation targeting combined with a ￿ exible exchange rate and
membership in a monetary union and derive equilibrium implications of the regime on real wages
and equilibrium employment.
A key result is that with perfect labour mobility between sectors, the monetary regime does not
matter for real wages, employment or pro￿ts. Moreover, I show that introducing labour mobility
substantially reduces wages and increases employment. Other ￿ndings are that when labour is
immobile between sectors: (i) real wages are higher under in￿ ation targeting than in a monetary
union in the tradables sector, while the reverse applies to the non-tradables sector; (ii) in￿ ation
targeting generates higher employment and pro￿ts than membership in a monetary union; and (iii)
both workers and ￿rms in the two sectors in general prefer in￿ ation targeting to membership in a
monetary union.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: The basic model is presented and solved in Section
2. Results and numerical solutions are presented in Section 3 and Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a small open economy consisting of a tradables (T) and a non-tradables (N) sector,
where subscript i = N;T indicates sector. The economy is inhabited by a large number of identical
households that consume the two goods and provide labour to two sets of identical ￿rms. The sector-
speci￿c wage is set by Nash bargaining between one large union and one employer￿ s federation in
each sector. In the labour market the individual takes wages as given.
The monetary target is given and credible to all players. The timing of events is as follows: In
stage one wages are set simultaneously in the two sectors under the assumption that wage setters
take the nominal wage set in the other sector as given. In stage two, the response of the central
bank will depend on the outcome of the wage set in the previous stage. Under in￿ ation targeting,
the central bank sets the nominal exchange rate, E, in order to keep the aggregate price level, P,
3constant, i.e. dlnP = 0: If the country is a member of a monetary union dlnE = 0 by de￿nition
and there is no monetary policy response to the claims made by wage setters. Finally, in stage
three, production, consumption and employment are determined as a consequence of the wage
setting outcome in stage two. In stage three workers decide in which sector to apply for a job if
there is labour mobility. The model is solved by backward induction and the equilibrium is subgame
perfect.
2.1 Production, Consumption and Employment
In the last stage of the model, pro￿t-maximising ￿rms decide on how much to produce and utility-
maximising households decide on how much to consume. On the labour market, workers take wages
as given and decide in which sector to apply for a job. Below, I model these choices of individual
agents.
2.1.1 Firms
Firms in each sector produce a homogeneous good with labour and capital as inputs. A represen-
tative ￿rm in sector i maximises real pro￿ts subject to a technology constraint and thus chooses
employment solving the following optimisation problem
max
Ni

























4where ￿i = ￿i












For simplicity I assume that ￿rms are owned by a group of capitalists in each sector who share
pro￿ts equally among them.
2.1.2 Households









I=P = (PNCN + PTCT)=P:
where P is the aggregate price level. Real income is taken as given:
I=P =
￿
wi if employed in sector i
￿i if capitalist in sector i
















The budget share of non-traded goods can be seen as a measure of openness in the economy, or
rather a measure of closedness, so that when ￿ ! 1, the economy is a completely closed economy
with production of only non-tradables.
Market clearing in each sector implies Ci = Yi, where Yi is aggregate supply.1 In what follows
I make the simplifying assumption that production technology is the same in the two sectors i.e.
1 Note that market clearing in the non-traded sector CN = YN implies balanced trade. Too see that this is
ful￿lled in equilibrium, use the fact that nominal output is equal to aggregate nominal income, i.e PNYN + PTYT =
PNCN + PTCT: Since CN = YN it follows that CT = YT:
5￿N = ￿T ￿ ￿, which implies that after using the expressions for sectoral equilibria, the demand














2.1.3 The Labour Market
Below I model the case when there is no labour mobility and the case when there is perfect labour
mobility, respectively. Note that the ￿rst case is equivalent to the static models in Holden (2003)
and Vartiainen (2002). Throughout the paper the case of no labour mobility will be treated as
the benchmark case when investigating how allowing for labour mobility a⁄ects the impact of the
monetary regime on real wages and employment.
No Labour Mobility
Consider ￿rst the case where there is no labour mobility. There is a ￿xed labour force M in the
economy, without loss of generality normalised to one. Workers take wages as given and jobs are
randomly assigned among the workforce. Let Mi be the number of union members (the labour force)
in sector i and let Ni be the number of employed workers in sector i: Consequently, the number of
unemployed workers in sector i, Ui, is given by Ui = Mi ￿ Ni: When referring to real wages I let
lower case letters denote real variables, i.e. wi = Wi
P : I let b denote the utility of unemployment
and assume that it is exogenously given. b can be thought of as the value of home production. A
representative union member is assumed to care about expected income, i.e. a weighted average of
income in the two states employment and unemployment. The expected utility of a representative











for i = N;T: Note that the utility of a worker is always positive as long as wi > b: In order to ensure
that a worker prefers employment to unemployment I assume that this condition always holds in
equilibrium.
6Perfect Labour Mobility
Next consider the case when there is perfect labour mobility. Union members take wages as given
when deciding in which sector to apply for a job. A job seeker can only apply for a job in one of
the sectors. Let f be the ￿ ow of workers from sector T to sector N. The expected income of a





















Since there is perfect labour mobility, I need to impose a no-arbitrage condition stating that there
will be no utility gains to be made by moving to the other sector in equilibrium, that is
VN = VT:



















Solving for f I obtain:
f =
MTNN (wN ￿ b) ￿ MNNT (wT ￿ b)
NN (wN ￿ b) + NT (wT ￿ b)
: (11)
Note that when there membership is equal in the two sectors, MN = MT and wage and employment
levels are the same in the two sectors, wN = wT and NN = NT, there will be no worker migration,
f = 0: The intuition is that when wages and employment levels are equal, workers receive the same
utility of being a job seeker in either of the two sectors and thus have no incentive to move to the
other sector to look for employment.
2.2 Monetary Policy
In stage two, the central bank maintains dlnP = 0 under in￿ ation targeting by adjusting the
nominal exchange rate, E.2 The central bank recognises that the law of one price holds for tradable
2 In theory, I might consider some other policy instrument than the exchange rate for the central bank, such as
the nominal interest rate, but I would then have to model an explicit link between the interest rate and domestic
demand, which would complicate the model.
7goods, PT = EP￿
T where PT is the price of the tradable good in domestic currency, E is the
nominal exchange rate in domestic currency per unit of foreign currency and P￿
T is the foreign price
of tradable goods in foreign currency. P￿
T is taken as exogenously given. In what follows, I do not
evaluate in detail how the central bank sets the nominal exchange rate, but merely recognise that
it always succeeds in its attempts so that the monetary target is attained.3 In a monetary union,
the central bank does not act since the nominal exchange rate is ￿xed, dlnE = 0:
Henceforth, let subindex m denote the monetary regime, m = M;I for the regimes monetary
union and in￿ ation targeting, respectively.4 To evaluate the regime-speci￿c impact of wages on
prices, I need to derive closed-form expressions for how supply and demand mechanisms in the
goods markets determine the responsiveness of price levels to wage changes under the two regimes.













; as "producer price e⁄ects", and the elasticity of the consumer












, as "consumer price e⁄ects".
Taking logs of the relative goods market equilibrium condition for relative prices (7) and di⁄er-
entiating the expression with respect to PN;PT;WN;WT gives:
dlnPN ￿ dlnPT =
￿
1 + ￿
(dlnWN ￿ dlnWT): (12)
Together with the expression for the aggregate price level (6), (12) determines the elasticities of
prices with respect to wages under the two monetary regimes. Taking logs and di⁄erentiating (6)
implies
dlnP = ￿dlnPN + (1 ￿ ￿)dlnPT: (13)
Under in￿ation targeting the consumer price e⁄ects are zero by de￿nition i.e. dlnP = 0: However,
nominal wages induce changes in producer price levels. Setting dlnP = 0 and substituting, in turn,
dlnPN = ￿
1￿￿
￿ dlnPT and dlnPT = ￿
￿
1￿￿dlnPN into (12) and rearranging gives the following
3 Di⁄erentiating the law of one price and the consumer price index, note that the reaction function of the central
bank can be written as dlnE = ￿
1
(1￿￿) [￿dlnPN + (1 ￿ ￿)dlnP
￿
T] under in￿ ation targeting.
4 Note that all endogenous variables are regime-speci￿c.


































Note that the price elasticities are computed under the assumption that dlnWi
dlnWj = 0. The reason
for this is that when analysing wage setting in the model, I need to describe how the union in
sector i perceives the e⁄ects of its wage decisions on sector j and this condition must hold in Nash
equilibrium.
In a Monetary Union dlnE = 0 by de￿nition. As long as there is no foreign in￿ ation, this




































Summing up, the regime-speci￿c elasticities of prices with respect to wages, i.e. the consumer and
producer price e⁄ects, are given by the expressions in Table 1. Column 1 displays the elasticities
under in￿ ation targeting and column 2 the elasticities in a monetary union.







0. The mechanisms at work are as follows. Suppose that there is a wage increase in the non-tradables
sector. This negative supply shock generates in￿ ation pressure, which the central bank o⁄sets by
appreciating the nominal exchange rate. The appreciation leads to lower prices in the tradables
sector, and the in￿ ation target is attained. Similarly, if there is a wage increase in the tradables
9Table 1: Producer and Consumer Price E⁄ects under the Two Regimes
























































sector, there is a reduction in output, leading to lower aggregate income and lower demand for
non-tradable goods. The fall in demand for non-tradables causes de￿ ationary pressure in the non-
tradables sector and on the aggregate level. Therefore, the central bank depreciates the nominal
exchange rate in order to raise the price of tradables in domestic currency. Hence, the aggregate
price level is unchanged and the in￿ ation target attained.
In a monetary union, the central bank does not react to the wage-setting outcome, since the
nominal exchange rate is ￿xed. If the nominal wage in the non-tradables sector is raised by one







1+￿ due to the negative
e⁄ect on supply. The aggregate price level increases with a factor that is proportional to the
producer-price e⁄ect, with the proportionality coe¢ cient given by the budget share of non-tradables.
In the tradables sector the producer price e⁄ect is zero.5 However, a wage increase in the
tradables-sector, causes a negative supply shift, which for a given price level, decreases tradables-
sector output. This in turn leads to a fall in aggregate nominal income, which generates a fall










5 According to the law of one price dlnPT = dlnE + dlnP
￿
T and hence dlnE = dlnP
￿
T = 0 implies dlnPT = 0:
102.3 Wage Setting
In the ￿rst stage of the game, wages are set by Nash bargaining between one large union and one
employer￿ s federation in each sector. Wages are set simultaneously in the two sectors, and when
bargaining over the wage in sector i, wage setters assume that the wage in the other sector Wjm
does not respond to Wim: The union cares about the utility of its own members, taking into account
that it is large enough to in￿ uence employment, as given by the labour demand function, and the
producer price of the own sector and the aggregate price level. When perfect labour mobility is
introduced, the union in sector i recognises that some of its members may move to sector j and
maximisation is then subject to an additional constraint: the no-arbitrage condition governing the
relative labour force distribution (11).
No Labour Mobility
I assume that the union in sector i is utilitarian and cares about the sum of utilities of its members,
i.e. MiVi: If the bargaining parties fail to reach an agreement workers will obtain the value of
unemployment so that the fall-back utility is ￿i0 = Mib. Union rents from reaching an agreement
can then be written:













= Nim (wim ￿ b)
The objective of the employer￿ s federation is to maximise real pro￿ts of the representative ￿rm as
given by (4). I assume that fall-back pro￿ts are zero, ￿0 = 0. Letting ￿i be the relative bargaining
power of the union in sector i, I may therefore de￿ne the Nash-product to be maximised in the
bargaining as:
￿i = [Nim (wim ￿ b)]
￿i [￿im]
1￿￿i :















































+ (1 ￿ ￿i)[￿im ￿ ￿’im] = 0 (14)
The ￿rst order condition states that the union￿ s marginal gain of an incremental wage increase
must balance the marginal loss of the employer￿ s federation of a wage increase. Note that both
parties bene￿t from a positive producer price e⁄ect: The union￿ s employment loss generated by a
marginal wage increase is partly o⁄set and nominal pro￿ts of ￿rms increase. Similarly, both parties
lose from a positive consumer price e⁄ect since it decreases real wages and real pro￿ts. Solving for








where m = I;M for the two regimes. Note that (15) represents two equations since i = N;T. The
regime-speci￿c price-elasticities ’im and ￿im, show how monetary policy in￿ uences wage setting,
and are therefore key parameters of interest. They display how unions may be constrained by the
central bank, as it sets the nominal exchange rate in order to o⁄set wage pressure threatening the
monetary target. Consequently, equilibrium wages are governed by the regime-speci￿c elasticities
displayed in Table 1.
Perfect Labour Mobility
When there is perfect labour mobility, the union still seeks to maximise the expected utility of its
members. Consider the union in sector i. Let Mii denote the number of workers who decide to stay
in sector i and seek employment which implies that Mi ￿ Mii workers move to sector j to look for
a job. Consequently, the union in sector i seeks to maximise:
MiiVi + (Mi ￿ Mii)Vj
12But since the union recognises that in equilibrium, it will always be true that Vi = Vj through
worker migration, the objective function of the union is still given by
￿i = MiVi
If parties fail to reach an agreement, members obtain the value associated with being unemployed
so that fall-back utility is ￿i0 = Mib. The objective functions of the two unions may then be
written:












Note that if there were no ￿ ows, fm = 0, the unions￿objective functions would be the same as in




















MTNNm (wNm ￿ b) ￿ MNmNTm (wTm ￿ b)
NNm (wNm ￿ b) + NTm (wTm ￿ b)
Pm = P(WNm;WTm)
Pim = Pi(WNm;WTm):
When there is perfect labour mobility, wage setters in sector i internalise the fact that their wage
decision a⁄ects the distribution of the labour force across sectors. Moreover, they need to take into
account that their wage decisions a⁄ect also prices in sector j. Therefore, it will prove useful to
introduce some additional notation. Let (1 ￿
dlnPj
dlnWi)m =  im (so that (1 ￿ dlnPi
dlnWj)m =  jm). The






















+ (1 ￿ ￿N)[￿Tm ￿ ￿’Tm] = 0 (17)
13where
@fm
@ lnWim is the e⁄ect on worker ￿ ows. The ￿rst term within brackets is the marginal e⁄ect on
union rents of a one percent wage increase. When the assumption of immobile labour is relaxed,
the additional terms
@fm
@ lnWNm=(MN + fm) and
@fm
@ lnWTm=(MN ￿ fm) enter the ￿rst order conditions
of the unions in sectors N and T, respectively. The intuition is that when the wage in sector i
increases, there will ceteris paribus be an in￿ ow of workers to that sector, increasing the stock of
workers competing for employment, thus reducing union rents from an agreement in the sector.
It will prove useful to consider the following relationship between the producer price e⁄ects
under regime m: By inserting the price elasticities from table 1 under the di⁄erent regimes, one
may show that










The pass-through to j-sector prices, Pjm; is always smaller than the direct impact of a wage increase
on prices in the own sector. The reason is that the e⁄ect on j-sector prices stems from an indirect
e⁄ect on aggregate income, while the e⁄ect on i-sector prices is the direct result of a negative shift
in supply. The result (18) implies (1 ￿ ￿ (1 + ’im ￿  im)) = 0 8i;m. Using this result, the e⁄ect
on net worker ￿ ows from the tradables sector to the non-tradables sector of a wage increase in the
two sectors can be written:
@fm
@ lnWNm
= (MN + MT)NNmNTmb
[(wNm ￿ b)(1 ￿ ￿Nm) + (wTm ￿ b)￿Nm]
[NNm (wNm ￿ b) + NTm (wTm ￿ b)]
2 > 0 (19)
And for the tradables sector:
@fm
@ lnWTm
= ￿(MN + MT)NNmNTmb
[(wTm ￿ b)(1 ￿ ￿Tm) + (wNm ￿ b)￿Tm]
[NNm (wNm ￿ b) + NTm (wTm ￿ b)]
2 < 0: (20)
Ceteris paribus, a wage increase in the non-tradables sector causes a net in￿ ow of workers to the
non-tradables sector since there is utility to be gained by migrating to that sector. In analogy, the
reverse holds true for an increase in wages in the tradables sector. Henceforth, let ~ denote the case




















where @fm=@ lnWim is given by the above expressions. Again, the price elasticities ’im and ￿im
display the in￿ uence of the monetary regime on wage setting. Unions and employers￿federations
bargaining with each other internalise the impact wage increases have on aggregate price levels
and take into account that the extent to which prices are allowed to increase is restricted by the
monetary target. Unions now internalise also the impact their wage claims have on prices in sector
j since they take into account that some of their members may move there, but since these e⁄ects
and the producer price e⁄ects in the own sector cancel out according to (18),  im does not matter
for the optimal wage.
Substituting for equilibrium net ￿ ows, fm, and @fm=@ lnWim I obtain the following expressions











￿N (1 ￿ ￿Nm)
[￿’Nm ￿ ￿Nm]













￿T (1 ￿ ￿Tm)
[￿’Tm ￿ ￿Tm]
b + (e wNm ￿ b)
￿
: (22)
The wage curves are now functions of employment in the two sectors and of wages in the other








￿i (1 ￿ ￿im)
[￿’im ￿ ￿im]











￿i (1 ￿ ￿im)
[￿’im ￿ ￿im]
b + (e wjm ￿ b)
￿
< 0:
The fact that the wage in sector i is a decreasing function of wages and employment in sector j
may at ￿rst seem counter-intuitive. Consider for instance the union in the non-tradables sector.
From the FOC of the union it follows that if
@fm
@ ln WNm
(MN+fm) increases, the union chooses a lower wage
since the marginal gain of a wage increase decreases. Therefore key to understanding why wNm is a
15decreasing function of NTm and wTm is studying the sensitivity of fm with respect to wNm;
@fm
@ lnwNm;
and the level of fm: I next consider, in turn, the e⁄ects of an increase in wages or employment in
the tradables sector on
@fm







> 0 if and only if







> 0 if and only if
NNm (wNm ￿ b) ￿ NTm (wTm ￿ b) > 0:
The sensitivity of ￿ ows to wTm and NTm may be positive or negative depending on wage levels,
employment rates and the consumer price e⁄ects. If employment and wages are higher in the non-
tradables sector than in the tradables sector, an increase in NTm increases the sensitivity of ￿ ows
to an increase in wNm: This in turn causes unions to set a lower wage.







When wages or employment in the tradables sector increase, fm decreases, i.e. there will be a lower
stock of workers in the non-tradables sector and for a given level of
@fm




increases. This means that the marginal gain of a wage increase to unions in the non-tradables
sector decreases and they set a lower wage. In other words, there will be a higher percentage increase
in union rents of a one percent wage increase for a given change in the labour stock,
@fm
@ lnWNm; if the
stock fm is small to begin with. Since the net e⁄ect is uncertain it is useful to consider the total
e⁄ect on the term
@fm
@ ln WNm














> 0 if and only if
NNm￿Nm ￿ NTm (1 ￿ ￿Nm) > 0







the e⁄ect on ￿ ows
@fm
@NTm always dominates so that when NTm increases, the unions marginal gain
of increasing wNm decreases, which causes them to set a lower wage. Thus, wNm is a decreasing
function of NTm: The net e⁄ect on the term of an increase in wTm is uncertain. Due to symmetry
a similar argument applies to unions in the tradables sector.
When comparing wage levels with and without mobility respectively it is trivial to prove the
following proposition:
Proposition 1 Wages are always lower when there is perfect mobility than when labour is immobile
between sectors, i.e.
wim > e wim
8i;m:
Proof. The wage curves (15) and (21)-(22) imply wim > e wim if and only if
h
￿i(1￿￿im)
[￿’im￿￿im]b + (e wjm ￿ b)
i
> 0: In equilibrium this holds true 8j;m and the proposition follows.
The key to understanding the above proposition lies in recalling that unions take into account
that some of their members may move to the other sector, but also that some of the members of the
other union may move to their sector. This provides incentive for wage restraint since they know
that if they set wages too high there will be an in￿ ow of workers from the other sector (i.e. workers
who are members of the other union) competing for jobs in their sector, thus reducing employment
probabilities and utility for their own members.
172.3.1 Decentralised Wage Setting
Suppose now that wages are set by unions that are so small that the wages they set are unable to
in￿ uence the aggregate price levels. Clearly, the monetary regime will not matter for real wages or
employment under this assumption, but it may be useful to compare the non-atomistic outcome to
the decentralised equilibrium. When wage setters are small, they do not need to take into account
that their wage decisions will a⁄ect price levels and the equilibrium wage is therefore obtained by








This equilibrium will serve as a useful benchmark when solving the model numerically.
2.4 Non-neutrality of the Monetary Regime
Why does the monetary regime potentially matter when setting is non-atomistic? The ￿rst order
conditions for the union in sector i; (14) and (16), respectively, de￿ne reaction functions: the real
wage in sector i, wim, as functions of the real wage in sector j, wjm. Moreover, the consumer
price level, Pm, will be a function of nominal wages in the two sectors and of the monetary regime.
Thus, the aggregate price level will di⁄er across regimes, PI 6= PM. In Nash equilibrium, the union
in sector i assumes that the nominal wage in sector j is ￿xed, but since the consumer price level
will di⁄er across regimes, so will the perceived consumer real wage in sector j, i.e. wjM 6= wjI:
The union in sector i therefore perceives that it is solving di⁄erent maximisation problems under
the two regimes. Consequently, also the real wage in sector i will be regime speci￿c, wiM 6= wiI
according to the reaction function in sector i.
For future reference, note the asymmetric features of a monetary union: When the exchange
rate is ￿xed, wages in the tradables sector may increase in￿nitely without any increase in the price
of tradables and without any reaction from the central bank. Moreover, a wage increase in the
non-tradables sector generates an increase in the price for non-tradables, also with no response
from the central bank. Under in￿ ation targeting however, the central bank is equally concerned
with in￿ ationary pressure from both sectors and makes sure that the in￿ ation target is attained by
adjusting the nominal exchange rate.
18In order to evaluate the impact of the monetary regime in this setting I need to derive the
general equilibrium. This is done in the next section.
2.5 Equilibrium
To simplify, I need to get rid of the producer real wage that enters the labour demand curves. By
using the de￿nition of the aggregate price level (6) and inserting the equilibrium relative price (7)























In equilibrium four equations determine the following endogenous variables: wNm;wTm;nNm and
nTm. The equations are the labour demand curves in each sector, (24) and (25), the sectoral wage
curves (15) or (21) and 22 (evaluated for i = N;T and the equilibrium price elasticities in Table 1).
No Labour Mobility
In the case with immobile labour, the wage curves are independent of employment rates and wages















Wages in the two sectors are a positive mark-up on the value of unemployment. Given wages,
employment rates are determined according to (24) and (25).
Perfect Labour Mobility
Next consider the case when there is perfect labour mobility. Note that the relative employment












19Substituting the expression for relative employment (28) into the wage curves (21) and (22) gives
two linear equations in two unknowns, e wTm and e wNm: I may therefore solve for equilibrium real
wages on reduced form:
e wNm =
￿
￿’Tm ￿ ￿Tm + ￿’Nm ￿ ￿Nm ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿Nm ￿ ￿Tm)





￿’Tm ￿ ￿Tm + ￿’Nm ￿ ￿Nm ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿Nm ￿ ￿Tm)
(￿’Nm ￿ ￿Nm)(1 ￿ ￿Tm) + (￿’Tm ￿ ￿Tm)￿Nm
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)b: (30)
Wages are still a markup on the value of unemployment, but the markup is now interacted with
the relative size of the non-tradables sector, ￿. As in the case with immobile labour, employment
rates are determined according to (24) and (25).
3 Analysis
In this section I ￿rst compare the equilibria under the two di⁄erent regimes analytically and then
solve the model numerically. Finally I address the issue of which interest groups in the economy
bene￿t from the two regimes.
3.1 Real Wage Rankings Across Regimes and Sectors
Inserting the equilibrium price elasticities given in Table 1 and simplifying, gives the reduced-form
expressions for regime-speci￿c consumer real wages given in Table 2 below.
First note that it is easy to verify Proposition 1 by looking at reduced-form wages: Wages are
always lower when there is perfect labour mobility than when labour is immobile between sectors.
The reason is that mobility creates incentive for wage restraint: if unions set wages too high there
will be an in￿ ow of workers to the sector, reducing union rents from a wage agreement.
Next, I evaluate the impact of di⁄erent regimes by comparing di⁄erent wage levels under in￿ a-
tion targeting and in a monetary union. I start by looking at the ranking of di⁄erent regimes in a
given sector and then look at how wages di⁄er across sectors under a given regime.



















































Proof. Given in Appendix.
The wage ranking stated in the proposition is consistent with previous literature, see Holden
(2003). In the tradables sector the result is explained by the fact that the positive producer price
e⁄ect under in￿ ation targeting is stronger than the negative consumer price e⁄ect in a monetary
union. In the non￿ tradables sector the positive producer price e⁄ect is so much stronger in a
monetary union than under in￿ ation targeting, that the mitigating consumer price e⁄ect in a
monetary union is neutralised.
I next evaluate how wages di⁄er across sectors under a given regime.
21Proposition 3 When labour is immobile between sectors, the ranking of sectoral wages under a
given regime is as follows:
wTI ￿ wNI if and only if ￿ ￿
1
2




Proof. Given in Appendix.
Under in￿ ation targeting, the wage will be higher in the tradables sector than in the non-
tradables sector if the latter is larger. Recall that there are no consumer price e⁄ects present to
deter wage-setters from raising the wage under this regime, only producer price e⁄ects. Perhaps the
easiest way to think about this result is by considering wage setters in the tradables sector. When
they raise wages, the fall in aggregate income that follows will cause de￿ ationary pressure in the
non-tradables sector, threatening the in￿ ation target. The central bank will therefore depreciate the
nominal exchange rate, which raises prices in the tradables sector. This in turn increases nominal
pro￿ts for the employer￿ s federation in the tradables sector and mitigates the negative impact on
N-sector employment caused by the wage increase. The de￿ ationary pressure in the non-tradables
sector is stronger the larger the sector, and so is the devaluation that follows. Therefore, the
larger the non-tradables sector (the larger ￿), the larger the devaluation, and thus the stronger the
incentives for wage setters in the tradables sector to raise wages.
As for the intuition in a monetary union, the term
(1+￿)
2 is clearly a threshold value for the
relative size of the non-tradables sector. Since there is no central bank to deter wage setters in this
sector from raising the wage in￿nitely, they will do so until the consumer price e⁄ect (decreasing
real wages and pro￿ts) becomes su¢ ciently damaging to them. In other words, wage setters in the
non-tradables sector exploit their strategic advantage of being small as long as ￿ ￿
(1+￿)
2 :
Proposition 4 When there is perfect labour mobility, there is wage equality across sectors and
regimes, i.e.
e wNI = e wTI = e wNM = e wTM:
Proof. The proposition follows directly from Table 2.
When there is perfect labour mobility between sectors, there is always wage equality across
sectors and regimes, i.e. the regime does not matter. This is not a trivial result, since it is the
22expected utility of a worker that should be the same in the two sectors by construction. It may
be shown that the reason there is wage equality under the two regimes, is that by substituting for
equilibrium relative labour demand given by (28) in (16) and (17), the unions in the two sectors
face the same ￿rst order condition regardless of regime.
3.1.1 A Crucial Assumption
The result that the regime does not matter as stated in Proposition 4, hinges on the assumption
of the utility of the unemployed being exogenously given in real terms. In contrast, think of the
case where the utility of the unemployed is interpreted as an unemployment bene￿t.6 Under the
assumption that the nominal unemployment bene￿t, B, is exogenously given there is an additional
e⁄ect present in the unions￿￿rst order conditions arising from the fact that the real unemployment
bene￿t, de￿ned as b = B
P ; is regime-speci￿c due to the impact of wages on prices.7 The unions￿￿rst
order conditions then de￿ne the following reaction functions: the wage in sector i as a function of
the real wage in sector j and of the real unemployment bene￿t b. When setting the wage, unions
assume that the nominal bene￿t B is exogenous. Since the response of the price level is regime-
speci￿c, so is the real unemployment bene￿t, b, and consequently the wage set in sector i. It turns
out that with an exogenous nominal bene￿t level and perfect mobility, wages are equalized across
sectors under in￿ ation targeting, but not in a monetary union. The intuition is that under in￿ ation
targeting, the consumer price e⁄ects are zero, and since they are the e⁄ects governing the real
unemployment bene￿t, the additional e⁄ect in the unions￿￿rst order conditions described above,
disappear. In a monetary union, however, there are consumer price e⁄ects present and this causes
the wage outcome under this regime to di⁄er from the outcome under in￿ ation targeting.
6 One way of modeling the ￿nancing of such an unemployment bene￿t would be to introduce a constant tax rate
levied on all labour income (both wage income and unemployment bene￿ts). A term equal to (1￿ ￿); where ￿ is the
tax rate, would then enter multiplicatively in equation (8), and thus not a⁄ect the maximisation problem of wage
setters. One way of closing the model in this case would be to introduce an exogenously given number of pensioners
(with the same Cobb-Douglas utility function as workers) into the model and assume that the tax on labour income
is used to ￿nance both unemployment bene￿ts and pensions. The pension level would then be determined residually
so that budget balance is always obtained.
7I focus on this case at length in an earlier version of the paper. Derivations are now given in Appendix.
233.2 Numerical Solutions
The aim of this section is to compute equilibrium employment rates and to assess the quantitative
importance of the mobility assumption by means of numerical illustrations.
3.2.1 Parameters
First, consider the parameters governing the labour demand curves. The level of the labour share in
production, ￿ is set equal to 0.5. Due to the asymmetric features of a monetary union, I suspect that
the degree of closedness, i.e. the relative size of the non-tradables sector ￿ is crucial for which sector
performs better under the two regimes and this is also shown to be true for models with immobile
labour, see Larsson and Zetterberg (2003). Therefore it is important to let this parameter assume
many di⁄erent values ranging from 0 (a super-open economy with only production of tradables) to
1 (a super-closed economy with only production of non-tradables). As a benchmark I will consider
the completely symmetric case when the two sectors are equally sized, i.e. letting ￿ = 0:5: I need
to calibrate the value of being unemployed so that it generates reasonable unemployment rates.
Consider the case when wage setting is completely decentralised and labour is immobile between








In order to keep b constant over di⁄erent degrees of openness etc. I need to calibrate something like
an economy average. I therefore impose complete symmetry across sectors, i.e., ￿N = ￿T = ￿ and
￿ = 0:5, i.e. I assume that sectors are equally large. From the wage curves it follows that there is
then real wage equality across sectors, i.e. wN = wT. Moreover, the labour demand curves in the
two sectors are identical and given by the following:
ni = w￿￿:
I next impose ￿ve percent unemployment in the economy, i.e. set ni = 0:475: Substituting for w
from the wage curve I obtain:
0:475 =
￿










￿ ￿ 1 + ￿
￿
:
Finally, the relative bargaining power of unions, ￿i, is set equal to 0:5, i.e. I consider symmetric
bargaining.
3.2.2 Results
Numerical solutions to the model are given in Table 3 below.
[ Table 3 about here ]
First note that the results verify Proposition 4: There is always wage equality across regimes
and sectors under perfect mobility. However, employment rates di⁄er across sectors since they are
governed by labour demand which in turn depends on the relative size of the non-tradables sector.
Also Proposition 1 is easily veri￿ed: wages in the two sectors are always lower under perfect
labour mobility. The results suggest that as a consequence of the reduction in wages, employment
in the two sectors is higher with mobile labour.
When labour is immobile between sectors, aggregate employment is always higher under in￿ ation
targeting than under exchange rate targeting. The model generates unrealistically low employment
levels with immobile labour, but aggregate employment rates are much improved and reach much
more realistic values under perfect labour mobility.
The results with immobile labour demonstrate the symmetric properties of in￿ ation targeting:
Wage levels and employment rates are symmetric around ￿ = 0:5 in the sense that the wage in the
non-tradables sector when ￿ = 0:4 is equal to the wage in the tradables sector when ￿ = 0:6: The
intuition is related to the fact that the central bank is equally concerned with wage pressure from
the two sectors under this regime and ￿ and 1￿￿ is a measure of the magnitude of the in￿ ationary
pressure generated by a wage increase in the non-tradables and tradables sectors, respectively. Thus,
the extent to which wage setters in the two sectors are punished by the central bank for excessive
wage claims is directly proportional to ￿: The pattern in a monetary union is not as symmetric but
nevertheless quite clear. In accordance with Proposition 2 wages in the non-tradables sector are
25always higher in a monetary union than under in￿ ation targeting, while the reverse holds true for
the tradables sector.
Turning to the ranking across sectors under a given regime and with immobile labour, note
that under in￿ ation targeting, wages in the tradables sector are only higher than wages in the non-
tradables sector when ￿ = 0:6 which is consistent with Proposition 3. For the parameterisation
considered here, the results in Table 3 suggest that in a monetary union, wages are always higher
in the non-tradables sector than in the tradables sector. This is also consistent with Proposition 3
since with ￿ = 0:5 I obtain 1+￿
2 = 1 which implies wNM > wTM for all ￿ < 1:
3.3 Political Economy Analysis
In this section I perform some political economy analysis by evaluating which groups bene￿t from
an in￿ ation target and membership in a monetary union, respectively. Table 4 displays implied
expected income levels of a worker and pro￿ts of ￿rms in the two sectors under di⁄erent regimes
and assumptions about mobility.
[ Table 4 about here ]
Consider ￿rst the results with immobile labour. The results suggest that when there is no labour
mobility, the expected income of a worker in the non-tradables sector is higher in a monetary union
than under in￿ ation targeting. This is mainly due to the fact that wages are always higher under
that regime. Employment in the non-tradables sector is lower in a monetary union than under
in￿ ation targeting, but the di⁄erence across regimes is not su¢ ciently large to o⁄set the di⁄erence
in wages. Similarly, the expected income of a worker in the tradables sector is always higher under
in￿ ation targeting than in a monetary union. Turning to ￿rms￿pro￿ts, the results show that
pro￿ts in both sectors are higher under in￿ ation targeting than in a monetary union when labour
is immobile between sectors. The result that ￿rms in both sectors would prefer in￿ ation targeting
to membership in a monetary union may seem inconsistent with the notion that many advocates
of a monetary union are found among ￿rms and entrepreneurs in the tradables sector. However,
the arguments typically made in favour of a monetary union, such as elimination of exchange rate
risk, reduction of transaction costs and so forth, are not present in the model. Moreover, I analyse
the incentives for wage restraint under the two regimes, and the subsequent e⁄ects on employment
26and pro￿ts but do not analyse shocks or evaluate the stabilising properties of the two monetary
regimes.
Introducing mobility, expected income is equal in both sectors by assumption, and this is veri￿ed
by the numerical results in Table 4. Since expected income is also equalised across regimes, a worker
in any of the two sectors is indi⁄erent between the two regimes. Moreover, pro￿ts are equalised
due to wage equality and also a ￿rm in either of the two sectors is indi⁄erent between in￿ ation
targeting and membership in a monetary union.
Finally, Table 4 suggests that when labour mobility is introduced, pro￿ts always increase due
to the reduction in wages and subsequent increase in employment established in Table 3.
Summing up, the model suggests that with immobile labour, all groups prefer in￿ ation targeting
to membership in a monetary union except for workers in the non-tradables sector who then prefer a
monetary union to in￿ ation targeting. When labour mobility is introduced, workers as well as ￿rms
in the two sectors are indi⁄erent between the two regimes since they generate the same expected
income and pro￿ts. This is a key result.
4 Concluding Remarks
I have presented a theoretical model of the impact of the monetary regime on wage setting and
employment in a small open economy when there is potential labour mobility between sectors. I
compare the outcomes under in￿ ation targeting and in a monetary union when the exchange rate
is irrevocably ￿xed. The monetary regime a⁄ects equilibrium wages and employment rates since
wage setters take into account whether or not the central bank will react to their wage claims under
a given monetary regime.
The main result of the paper is that when perfect labour mobility is introduced, the monetary
regime does not matter for equilibrium real wages, pro￿ts or employment. As a consequence,
workers as well as ￿rms in the two sectors are indi⁄erent between the two regimes since they
generate the same expected income and pro￿ts. Introducing labour mobility substantially increases
aggregate employment as a consequence of the reduction in wages that follows from the migration
of workers between sectors.
With immobile labour, I show that the consumer real wage in the tradables sector is higher
27under in￿ ation targeting than in a monetary union, while the consumer real wage in the non-
tradables sector is higher in a monetary union than under in￿ ation targeting. Moreover, the real
wage is higher in the larger sector under in￿ ation targeting, while in a monetary union the wage
is higher in the non-tradables sector than in the tradables sector provided that the economy is
su¢ ciently open (i.e. the non-tradables sector is not too large). The numerical solutions to the
model suggest that, with immobile labour, aggregate employment levels are higher under in￿ ation
targeting than in a monetary union.
When investigating which interest groups in the economy bene￿t from which regimes under no
labour mobility, a striking result is that the only group that prefers a monetary union to in￿ ation
targeting is workers in the non-tradables sector, who bene￿t from a ￿xed exchange rate since it
generates higher expected income than in￿ ation targeting. The fact that in￿ ation targeting is
preferred also by workers and ￿rms in the tradables sector may at ￿rst seem contradictory to the
notion that ￿rms and entrepreneurs engaging in international trade often provide arguments in
favour of membership in the EMU. However, in the policy debate, advocates of a monetary union
generally refer to features not included in my model, such as elimination of exchange rate risk and
transaction costs.
There are several interesting extensions to the model to be considered. First, I would like to
allow for the fact that a large country in a monetary union may not treat the response of the
nominal exchange rate as exogenous. This feature could be accounted for in the model by letting
the response of the nominal exchange rate in the economy be proportional to the size of the country.
Second, it would be interesting to consider complete centralisation in the model, i.e. a setting in
which one single union sets nominal wages for the two sectors. Finally, a setting which has a lot of
real-world relevance is the case where unions set wages sequentially, i.e. where one of the unions
acts as a Stackelberg leader relative to the other.
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Table 3: Numerical Solutions of the Model, ￿ = 0:5; ￿ = 0:5
Regime Monetary Union In￿ ation Targeting
No mobility Perfect mobility No mobility Perfect mobility
￿
0.2 nN 0.0311 0.1567 0.0532 0.1567
nT 0.425 0.6268 0.4581 0.6268
n 0.4561 0.7835 0.4888 0.7835
wN 5.3202 1.451 3.3856 1.451
wT 1.5584 1.451 1.5719 1.451
f -0.3 -0.3
0.3 nN 0.0717 0.2625 0.1132 0.2625
nT 0.3826 0.6125 0.4107 0.6125
n 0.4543 0.875 0.5239 0.875
wN 3.708 1.451 2.5795 1.451
wT 1.6217 1.451 1.6582 1.451
f -0.2 -0.2
0.4 nN 0.1287 0.3724 0.1872 0.3724
nT 0.3308 0.5586 0.3446 0.5586
n 0.4595 0.931 0.5318 0.9310
wN 2.9019 1.451 2.1764 1.451
wT 1.6928 1.451 1.7734 1.451
f -0.1 -0.1
0.5 nN 0.1997 0.475 0.2672 0.475
nT 0.2723 0.475 0.2672 0.475
n 0.472 0.95 0.5344 0.9500
wN 2.4183 1.451 1.9346 1.451
wT 1.7734 1.451 1.9346 1.451
f 0.0 0.0
0.6 nN 0.2805 0.5586 0.3446 0.5586
nT 0.2101 0.3724 0.1872 0.3724
n 0.4906 0.931 0.5318 0.9310
wN 2.0958 1.451 1.7734 1.451
wT 1.8655 1.451 2.1764 1.451
f 0.1 0.1
30Table 4: Expected Income and Firm Pro￿ts in the Two Sectors, ￿ = 0:5; ￿ = 0:5
Regime Monetary Union In￿ ation Targeting
No mobility Perfect mobility No mobility Perfect mobility
￿
0.2 VN 1.2383 1.3462 1.2245 1.3462
VT 1.4698 1.3462 1.5212 1.3462
￿N 0.1656 0.2274 0.18 0.2274
￿T 0.6623 0.9094 0.72 0.9094
0.3 VN 1.3604 1.3905 1.3322 1.3905
VT 1.4680 1.3905 1.5348 1.3905
￿N 0.2659 0.3809 0.2919 0.3809
￿T 0.6204 0.3809 0.6811 0.8887
0.4 VN 1.4651 1.4176 1.4199 1.4176
VT 1.4473 1.4176 1.5228 1.4176
￿N 0.3733 0.5404 0.4073 0.5404
￿T 0.5600 0.8106 0.611 0.8106
0.5 VN 1.5468 1.4268 1.4842 1.4268
VT 1.4063 1.4268 1.4842 1.4268
￿N 0.4829 0.6892 0.5169 0.6892
￿T 0.4829 0.6892 0.5169 0.6892
0.6 VN 1.6004 1.4176 1.5228 1.4176
VT 1.3447 1.4176 1.4199 1.4176
￿N 0.5879 0.8106 0.611 0.8106
￿T 0.5879 0.5404 0.4073 0.5404
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A1 Proofs
Proposition 2 When labour is immobile between sectors, the ranking of regimes within each
sector is as follows:
wTI > wTM
wNM > wNI
Proof. According to Table 2 wTI > wTM if and only if
￿





(1 + ￿)(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿ (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿)
￿
b ,
[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿][￿ (1 + ￿) ￿ ￿￿] > (1 ￿ ￿)￿ [(1 + ￿)(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)] ,
[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿][￿ (1 + ￿) ￿ ￿￿] > (1 ￿ ￿)￿ [(1 + ￿)￿ ￿ ￿￿ + ￿(1 + ￿) + ￿￿￿] ,
￿[￿ (1 + ￿) ￿ ￿￿] > (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿(1 + ￿ + ￿￿) ,
1 + ￿ ￿ ￿ > (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿ + ￿￿) ,
￿ > (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + ￿￿) ,






Similarly: wNM > wNI if and only if
￿









￿(1 + ￿) + ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿) > ￿ + ￿￿ ,
￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿) > 0
which holds true 8￿ 2 (0;1) and the proposition follows.
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given regime is as follows:
wTI ￿ wNI if and only if ￿ ￿
1
2
wNM ￿ wTM if and only if ￿ ￿
(1 + ￿)
2
Proof. According to Table 2 wTI ￿ wNI if and only if
￿









￿ [￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[￿ + ￿￿] ,
￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿ ,




Moreover, wNM ￿ wTM if and only if
￿





(1 + ￿)(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿ (1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)
￿
b ,
[1 + ￿ ￿ ￿][￿(1 + ￿) + ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)] ￿ ￿ [(1 + ￿)(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)] ,
(1 + ￿)[￿(1 + ￿) + ￿￿] ￿ ￿ [(1 + ￿)(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿(1 + ￿) + ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)] ,
[￿(1 + ￿) + ￿￿] ￿ ￿ [￿ + ￿ + ￿] ,




and the proposition follows.
33A2 Nominal Value of Unemployment Exogenously Given
The nominal wage solves:
max
lnWim
















MTNNm (wNm ￿ b) ￿ MNmNTm (wTm ￿ b)
NNm (wNm ￿ b) + NTm (wTm ￿ b)
Pm = P(WNm;WTm)
Pim = Pi(WNm;WTm):








wNm￿Nm + b(1 ￿ ￿Nm)
(wNm ￿ b)
#








wTm￿T + b(1 ￿ ￿T)
(wTm ￿ b)
#





(MN + MT)NNmNTm (wTm ￿ b)b





(MN + MT)NNmNTm (wNm ￿ b)b
[NNm (wNm ￿ b) + NTm (wTm ￿ b)]
2 < 0:
The ￿rst order conditions (31) and (32) show why there is wage equality under in￿ ation targeting
but not in a monetary union. Under in￿ ation targeting, ￿NI = ￿TI = 1 and the additional term
stemming from the e⁄ect on b vanishes. Thus, one may think of the case with an exogenous B
under in￿ ation targeting as a special case of the value of unemployment being given in real terms.
In a monetary union ￿iM 6= 1 and this di⁄erence in consumer price outcomes across regimes causes
also real wages under in￿ ation targeting to di⁄er from real wages in a monetary union.
Substituting for equilibrium net ￿ ows, fm, and @fm=@ lnWim and letting ^ denote the case
with perfect mobility under the assumption of an exogenous B, I obtain the following expressions




















(b wNm ￿ b):
Substituting the expression for relative employment (28) into the wage curves above yields equilib-























Evaluating the wage curves for the equilibrium price elasticities I obtain:





















Thus, wiI 6= wiM for i = N;T, i.e. the monetary regime matters for equilibrium real wages when
the value of being unemployed is treated as exogenously given in nominal terms.
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